Intensive Board Monitoring, Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU - Université de Bourgogne Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Accounting in Europe Année : 2020

Intensive Board Monitoring, Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU

Résumé

This study examined the association between intensive board monitoring (IBM) and segment disclosure quality (SDQ). It also investigated whether this association can be moderated by firm's home country investor protection (IP) level. Based on a panel of 271 non-financial European Union (EU) listed corporations covering the 2007–2012 period, this study estimated two multiple regression models including industry and year fixed effects. We found evidence that the segment disclosure quality is higher when a majority of outside directors serve on monitoring committees. We, also, found that the positive association between IBM and SDQ is more pronounced for firms in a weak IP environment and less pronounced for firms in a strong IP environment. Thus, we provided evidence in favor of a substitutive relationship between IBM and IP level with respect to their association with SDQ. Our findings are evidenced by several robustness tests.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-03199984 , version 1 (16-04-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Sameh Kobbi-Fakhfakh, Ridha Mohamed Shabou, Benoît Pigé. Intensive Board Monitoring, Investor Protection and Segment Disclosure Quality: Evidence from EU. Accounting in Europe, 2020, 17 (1), pp.52-77. ⟨10.1080/17449480.2019.1646427⟩. ⟨hal-03199984⟩
61 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More